Summary
Introduction
The right of access to information 1 is the hallmark of an effective constitutional democracy. 2 This right is a component of the broader right to freedom of expression recognised in basic instruments of the United Nations (UN) 3 and regional human rights systems. 4 The right of access to information has gained recognition as a stand-alone right guaranteed in constitutions and other laws. 5 The right imposes a duty on the state to facilitate access of everyone 6 to information held by public bodies 7 in any accessible form or retrieval systems, howsoever produced. 8 Nevertheless, international human rights law recognises the significance of varied backgrounds in which human rightsincluding the right of access to information -must be protected. 9 'The African human rights system', which is the totality of human rights protection under the auspices of the African Union (AU), 10 one such system. 11 Significant similarities and marked differences exist in article 19 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) and corresponding provisions in comparative regional instruments. 12 The content, scope and extent to which the right of access to information in practice is respected also differ. 13 This necessitates an analysis of the guarantee of these rights in the African human rights system, 14 taking a cue from the emerging praxis in the older UN and Inter-American human rights systems. 15 For instance, the Inter-American Court has interpreted the right to seek and receive information in article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights as encompassing the right of access to information subject to imminent threats to national security. 16 Article 13 differs slightly from article 10 of the European Convention, which protects the right 'to receive and impart information' simpliciter. By article 9(1) of the African Charter modestly guarantees 'the right to receive information'. The pertinent question then is to what extent the African human rights system respects the right of access to information. Can this right be restricted in the interests of national security of states? This article claims that the African human rights system recognises the right, particularly through article 9 of the African Charter, the exercise of which may not be restricted on national security grounds unless, as demonstrably justified by law, for a legitimate purpose and as necessary in a democratic society. To demonstrate the claim, part 1 sets out the discussion's context. Part 2 of the article appraises the development of the right of access to information standards and national security limitations thereto. Part 3 evaluates the right of access to information standards in the African Charter and national security exceptions, while part 4 evaluates legislative compliance by African countries with regional standards enunciated in part 3. Part 5 is the conclusion.
2 Right of access to information: Development, rationale and normative scope
The growing importance of the right to information in contemporary times 17 came about for several reasons. As Bovens argues, citizens' access to information on democratic governance enhances public control of government, which is likely to abuse public power when such access is lacking. 18 Moreover, the quality of democratic processes is strengthened by public participation in decision making by well-informed citizens. 19 Therefore, since democracy exists to safeguard the public interest, 20 a legally-enforceable right to information on how people are governed will boost public confidence in government and enhance accountability. 21 Furthermore, access to information is a vital tool to combat corruption by making government activities more transparent and the concealment of 24 Thus, the force of the argument that democracy provides one of the philosophical foundations for human rights 25 has a greater impact to support the right to information, but the effective realisation of this right often depends on the reading of the relevant provisions.
International right of access to information standards
In 1946, the UN General Assembly initiated the future discourse on the right to information when it stated that '[f]reedom of information is … the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the UN is consecrated'. 26 The right to access information held by public authorities is a fundamental human right which should be given effect at the national level through comprehensive legislation (for example Freedom of Information Acts) based on the principle of maximum disclosure, establishing a presumption that all information is accessible subject only to a narrow system of exceptions.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) in General Comment 34 firmly located the right to information among civil and political rights by stating categorically that article 19(2) of the ICCPR embraces the right to information held by public bodies regardless of the form in which the information is stored, its source and production date. 33 Consequently, Article 19, an activist body, developed nine principles on states' obligations to enact right to information laws in its Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation. 34 These encapsulate the minimum standards for right to information laws. 'Maximum disclosure' confirms the obligation to release all official information except in clear and narrow exceptions. 'Obligation to publish' establishes the obligation to proactively publish public interest information. The 'promotion of open government' principle recognises states' obligations to tackle government secrecy. 'Limited scope of exemptions' prohibits exemptions that protect government from embarrassment or the exposure of wrongdoing by subjecting non-disclosure to a public interest override. Lastly, a right to information or freedom of information law has primacy over secrecy The decision significantly opens a vista for the enriching of interregional access to information jurisprudence because regional bodies, including those on the African continent, can draw inspiration from Claude Reyes.
African right of access to information standards
The African Charter provides in article 9:
1 Every individual shall have the right to receive information.
2 Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.
According to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), article 9 signifies that freedom of expression is a basic right vital to personal development and civic participation.
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Beyond that, article 9 as narrowly phrased does not guarantee the right to obtain information which the state may not be willing to release. 39 Nevertheless, this harsh reality has been toned down drastically by the Commission. The Commission is mandated 'to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa' 40 and to monitor the Charter's implementation particularly through its protective mandate, 41 which extends over state parties and persons subject to the African Charter. 42 The African Commission has adopted a creative interpretive approach based on the interrelatedness of rights, 43 positive obligations and implied rights to develop otherwise poorly-drafted Charter provisions, especially those on socio-economic rights. 44 As the African Commission rightly observed in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria (SERAC): 45 Clearly, collective rights, environmental rights, and economic and social rights are essential elements of human rights in Africa. The African Commission will apply any of the diverse rights contained in the African Charter. It welcomes this opportunity to make clear that there is no right in the African Charter that cannot be made effective.
It would be appropriate to examine each of these three vital concepts further.
Positive obligations
Positive obligations emanate from article 1 of the African Charter, which provides:
The member states of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.
Starting essentially with SERAC, 46 the African Commission has constantly maintained that article 1 places binding negative and positive obligations on states like comparable international treaties, 47 although it is sometimes inconsistent in the application of this principle. 48 The SERAC communication alleged that environmental pollution arising from oil exploration in Ogoniland by the Nigerian government and a foreign company, Shell Petroleum, contaminated food sources, occasioned the loss of livelihoods and risks to human health. SERAC claimed that the respondents refused to inform the Ogonis of the harmful effects of oil production or involve them in the development of their resources, but deployed military forces to destroy Ogoni houses contrary to Charter protections. The African Commission decided that all rights generate at least four levels of duties -'the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights' which 'entail a combination of negative and positive duties'. 49 The duty to respect entails non-interference with rights. 50 The duty to protect requires taking appropriate measures to prevent rights violations. 51 The duty to promote requires the facilitation of rights enjoyment by relevant means. 52 The obligation to fulfil dictates the actualisation of rights through direct provision of basic needs and services.
53 Accordingly, the Commission found Nigeria to be in violation of its positive obligations in terms of article 16 (the right to enjoy physical and mental health) and article 24 (the right to a general satisfactory environment) to take steps, but which it failed to do, by
[o]rdering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities. 54
Implied rights
The African Commission boosted the enjoyment of expressly guaranteed rights by deciding that rights not expressly excluded may be implied or read into the Charter. 55 Accordingly, the Commission held that the respondents violated the right to housing by forcefully ejecting the Ogonis from their homes. 56 The Commission stated that '[p]rotection of the family forbids the wanton destruction of shelter' because 'when housing is destroyed, property, health, and family life are adversely affected' and the other way round. 57 Thus, the Commission read into articles 14, 16 and 18 (obligation to protect the family) a right to housing or shelter, which the African Charter does not expressly guarantee. 58 Similarly, the Commission found that Nigeria had violated the right to food implicit in the rights to life and health, articles 4 and 16, respectively: 59 
Interrelatedness of rights
SERAC demonstrated the parity of socio-economic and civil and political rights in the African Charter. 60 The African Commission found the rights to life and family life to be underscored by the protection of human health, the environment, food sources, property, and so forth. 61 The Commission particularly found that the violation of rights to development (article 24) and health was underscored by a violation of the Ogonis' 'right to be informed of hazardous activities', such as the oil exploration on their land, and laid down the applicable principles as follows: 62 Government compliance with the spirit of articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter must also include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.
Made in the context of a communication touching on the right to control resources (article 21), these principles presuppose an obligation on government and private bodies to proactively disclose information of public interest for participatory decision making. Fortunately, since SERAC, the African Commission has utilised its promotional mandate to explicitly recognise the right to information through a supplemental soft law to article 9.
Elaborations on the content and scope of the right of access to information in article 9
Mindful of the narrow scope of article 9 of the African Charter, the African Commission adopted a supplemental, albeit non-binding, acceptance in the African human rights system of the right to information as a stand-alone right.
Freedom of Expression Declaration
This Declaration synchronises article 9 with emerging international right to information standards and principles, and establishes the nexus between this right and the right to freedom of expression. The Declaration acknowledges that freedom of expression embraces the right to information necessary for transparency, accountability 'and the strengthening of democracy'. 64 The Declaration affirms the positive obligation of states to guarantee the right, subject only to clearly-defined rules established by law, 65 including information held by private bodies, which is necessary for the exercise of any right (Principle IV (2)). The Declaration preserves the principle of proactive disclosure by requiring public bodies actively to publish information of significant public interest 'even in the absence of a request', and protects public interest disclosures. 66 To remedy any infringement of the right to information, the 'refusal to disclose information' is made subject to appeal to an independent review. 67 Most importantly, the Declaration articulates the positive obligation of states to amend their secrecy laws to comply with 'freedom of information principles'. In furtherance of the commitment to ensure transparency in governance, the African Commission's Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression (Special Rapporteur) has developed a Model Law in tandem with right to information principles.
Model Law on Access to Information in Africa
The Special Rapporteur was established pursuant to the African Commission's promotional mandate, to inter alia monitor states' compliance with right to information (RTI) standards in general and the Declaration in particular. 68 
National security exemption, public interest override and African right of access to information standards
Despite adopting right to information laws, 75 which are inoperable or deficient, 76 many African states still have Official Secrets Acts (OSAs) and national security statutes which criminalise the unauthorised disclosure of government information regardless of national security implications. 77 Furthermore, most of these laws have not been tested judicially for compatibility with African right to information standards.
The starting point then to determine the scope of a right to information law's national security exemption are the applicable criteria under the relevant 'harm test' and the public interest override tests. 78 Accordingly, the Model Law and other Principles come in handy.
The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information 2013 (Tshwane Principles), adopted by international law experts in Tshwane, South Africa, in 2013, are relevant. 79 The Principles aim to ensure 'that information may only be withheld where the public interest in maintaining the information's secrecy clearly outweighs the public interest' in the right to information 80 and 'overriding public interest in disclosure' such that 'withholding on grounds of national security can never be justified'. 81 The public interest override calls for 'balancing the risk of harm [to national security] against the public interest in disclosure', taking due account of relevant factors. Where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the risk of harm, the information sought must be supplied. Furthermore, the non-disclosure of national security information must be prescribed by law, and be necessary in a democratic society for the protection of a national security interest. 82 Similarly, the Model Law recognises an exemption to the right to information to protect national security and defence (article 30), subject to a 'public interest override' against which to test an exemption's legitimacy (article 25), the threshold being 'substantial prejudice to the security or defence of the state' (section 30(1)). Section 30(2) of the Model Law admirably defines 'security or defence of the state' in narrow terms in five categories; that is, military tactics on subversive or hostile activities; defence intelligence or intelligence on subversive or hostile activities; defence intelligence methods or intelligence on subversive or hostile activities; the identity of a confidential source; and the capabilities or vulnerabilities of defence systems excluding nuclear weaponry. Section 30(3) further explains the terms 'subversive or hostile' activities to mean attacks from foreign elements, sabotage, terrorism and espionage. Explicitly defining national security in law is an important practice in democratic societies, but since the Model Law is only a guide, these categories could be further clarified, for instance, concerning nuclear weaponry. The latter would be better addressed by an appropriate national security law or provision enacted in accordance with democratic principles. Nonetheless, the above provisions provide a clear framework for analysis of a national security exemption. I next examine the extent to which national security exemptions in African RTI laws comply with the region's standards and the relevance of article 9 jurisprudence in this regard. Some RTI laws contain primacy provisions specifying the overriding role of the public interest. Starting from West Africa, Liberia's highlyrated Freedom of Information Act of 2010 guarantees to everyone the right to information subject only to the Constitution. The Act exempts documents or records the disclosure of which 'would cause injury or substantial harm to Liberia's security or defence (section 4(2)), and prescribes a public interest override (section 4(8)). Sierra Leone's Right to Access Information Act of 2013 guarantees the right to every person (sections 2(1) and (2)), but permits the non-disclosure of information which 'would or could reasonably be expected to seriously prejudice national security and the defence', while section 12(2) provides a public interest override test. Nigeria's Freedom of Information Act of 2011 provides a weak threshold for exempted national security and defence-related information (section 11 (1)), which is what 'may be injurious' while the public interest override is in section 11(2). Compared to Nigeria, Uganda's Access to Information Act of 2005, which gives effect to every citizen's constitutional right to information, recognises a slightly higher non-disclosure threshold where disclosure 'is likely to prejudice' state security (article 5). However, it broadly defines 'security' to mean 'the protection of Uganda against … crime, criminals and attacks by foreign countries' (section 4). 86 Similarly, section 3(a) of Kenya's Access to Information Act of 2016 gives effect to every citizen's constitutional right to information, but provides that the right shall be constitutionally limited in respect of information 'likely to' undermine national security (section 6(1)(a)). Unfortunately, the Act's description of national security-related information 87 is infinitely elastic, covering not only economic matters and the conduct of government affairs, but any 'information whose unauthorised disclosure would prejudice national security' (section 6(2)(a)). A subdued public interest override thus exists in section 6(4) under which disclosure 'may be required … as shall be determined by a court'.
National security exemption to the right to information in
Angola's Law on Access to Documents Held by Public Authorities 2002 authorises the head of a public body to withhold national security or defence-related information or the existence or nonexistence thereof upon certifying that its disclosure 'would be almost certain to cause serious harm to national security' (article 35(1)). However, such certification is not subject to any judicial review except by the House of Peoples' Representatives before which it must be tabled. Nevertheless, the Proclamation enjoins public officers to apply a public interest override before non-disclosure (section 28). Rwanda's Access to Information Law 4 of 2013 gives expansive rights to information to 'things intended to be published, facts, speeches in reports, mails, circulars, logbooks … and any other material of public interest by everyone' (article 3). The information withheld shall not be published if 'it may destabilise national security' (article 4(1)). Unfortunately, it still gives much discretion to the responsible Minister to issue an order determining which information could destabilise national security (article 5). As well, a public interest override exists in article 6. A person's right to information guaranteed in section 5(1) of the Malawian Access to Information Act of 2016 may be denied where disclosure would 'reasonably be expected' to damage the security or defence of Malawi, while any such refusal must satisfy the public interest override (section 38). South Sudan's Right to Information Act of 2013 protects every citizen's right to information to knowledge, facts or documents of public interest (section 4(3) and 4(4)), but allows the withholding of a record which 'is likely to jeopardise' national defence and security (section 30). It explicitly defines, in line with the Model Law, 'security of the defence of South Sudan' to mean military tactics, defence intelligence, identity of a confidential source, vulnerabilities of weapons, and so on (section 2(a)). Section 22 sets out a public interest override that specifically states that mere security classification is not an exemption category. South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) 2 of 2000 gives effect to constitutional protection for the right to information. PAIA is considered to be model legislation in Africa considering inter alia that information of which the disclosure 'could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice' to the defence and security, must be disclosed if 'the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs the harm contemplated' (article 41(1)(a)(i)(ii)). Tunisia's Organic Law 2016-22 of 2016 exempts information prejudicial to national security or defence subject to the 'injury test' and public interest test taking into account relevant factors.
Some states have laws without a public interest override. Burkina Faso's Access to Public Information and Administrative Documents Law of 2014 exempts classified documents and data where disclosure is likely to cause serious damage to national defence and state security as determined by order of the Minister of Defence (articles 36-38), and not subject to any public interest override. Ethiopia's Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation 590 of 2008 gives effect to citizens' rights to information (articles 11 and 12), but exempts information excluded by any other legislation (article 15), subject to unspecified 'justifiable limits based on overriding public and private interests'. Guinea's Organic Law L 2010/004/Cnt of 2010 protects the right of '[a]nyone, regardless of nationality or occupation' without disclosing any special interest to public information contained in minutes, statistics, directives, instructions, circulars, calls for tenders, and so on, in accordance with article 7 of the Guinea Constitution (article 1). It excludes 'information concerning institutions dealing with state security affairs or those held by them' 'the disclosure of which would seriously undermine the secrets protected by law', but specifies no public interest test. Zimbabwe's Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002 88 has been severely criticised for impeding rather than enhancing the right to information. 89 For instance, it deprives non-citizens and holders of temporary resident, work and student permits of any right to information (section 5(3)). It has no public interest override, while its exemption categories are also overly broad. It debars access to information where disclosure would prejudice the defence and national security and the country's safety or interests (section 17(1)(b)), although it provides for the mandatory disclosure of 'any matter that threatens national security' (section 28(1)(ii)). Article 2 of Niger's Ordinance 2011-22 of 2011 on the Charter on Access to Public and Administrative Documents protects everyone's right to all publicly held data or knowledge existing in written, graphic, video, audio or audio-visual form. It prohibits disclosure of executive documents or information pertaining to national defence secrets, state security or security of persons. Togo's Freedom of Information Act of 2016 guarantees citizens' right to public information and documentation (article 1), excluding security and national defence-related information (article 2). The law has no 88 AIPP https://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/030611aippaamd.asp?sector= LEGIS (accessed 15 October 2917). 89 Darch & Underwood (n 6 above).
public override or harm test, but compels a public body to refuse to confirm the existence or to communicate any information that may affect the security of the state (article 38). Unauthorised disclosure of 'non-communicable information' is punishable by administrative penalties and other applicable sanctions.
Tanzania's Access to Information Act of 2016, 90 which gives rights to information accorded only to Tanzanian citizens (section 5), exempts information where the disclosure may undermine defence and national security (section 6(2)(a)). The Act disappointedly expands 'information relating to national security' to 'foreign relations or foreign activities' (section 6(3)(d)) and has no explicit public interest override. English translations of Mozambique's Access to Information Act of 2014 are not readily available, but an online article states that the law exempts 'state secrets defined by law'. 91 The existence of a public interest override in the law is not clear.
States without RTI laws include Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Mauritius, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Zambia, Seychelles, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nevertheless, the African Commission and African Court can still give effect to RTI at the regional level in these states. The Commission can draw from international treaties and jurisprudence, such as the ICCPR and Claude Reyes & Others, 92 and the African Court can enforce international instruments binding on states that have ratified its Protocol and permit personal cases. Moreover, 54 African states have ratified the African Charter. 93 Notably, the constitutions of some of the countries concerned treat international agreements ratified by them as superior to domestic law 94 while some constitutions provide that treaties be incorporated into domestic law 95 or became operative by National Assembly Resolution. 96 The Constitutions of countries such as Burundi (article 292), Cape Verde (article 12), Egypt (article 151) and Gabon (article 114) provide that ratified treaties enter into force upon publication. In addition, the interpretation clauses of constitutions of the countries concerned also provide for the use of international treaties as interpretative aid. For countries like Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Burundi, the African Charter recited in the Preambles are explicitly made part of their Constitutions. 97 For Namibia, domesticated international agreements form part of its law. 98 The Swaziland Constitution provides that once approved by parliament, self-executing agreements become operative. African right to information standards thus can be enforced creatively through the opportunities provided by such constitutional provisions. Lastly, the Commission's copious and the African Court's incipient jurisprudence on national security restrictions to freedom of expression are also analytically useful.
Three-part test of national security restrictions in the African
Commission's and African Court's jurisprudence
This section highlights the African Commission's and Court's jurisprudence on national security restrictions on article 9 rights with a view to showing how these institutions could deal with future RTIrestriction cases. Of course, it is worth noting that independent or judicial scrutiny of non-disclosure becomes relevant after a public or private body, as the case may be, might have applied the harm and public interest override tests, albeit objectionably. The entire architecture of article 9 prescribes no explicit limitation criteria except the phrase 'within the law' in article 9(2) which prima facie gives leeway for open-ended qualifications to freedom of expression. 99 However, the Commission has admirably curtailed undue restrictions, and the exercise of unfettered discretion or attempts by states to avoid their article 1 obligations. 100 Hence, the Commission has acknowledged: 101 Though in the African Charter, the grounds of limitation to freedom of expression are not expressly provided as in other international and regional human rights treaties, the phrase 'within the law', under article 9(2) provides a leeway to cautiously fit in legitimate and justifiable individual, collective and national interests as grounds of limitation.
Furthermore, based on the Commission's evolutionary jurisprudence on the nature of duties imposed by the African Charter, article 27(2) has become the general limitation clause of the Charter. 102 Article 27(2) provides that '[t]he rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest'. Consequently, the totality of the Commission's jurisprudence and elaborations regarding restrictions to article 9 reveals that a restriction must be prescribed by 'law', serve a 'legitimate' public interest; and be strictly 'necessary' to achieve that legitimate interest. These are similar to those found in international human rights law and jurisprudence. 103 I now analyse each requirement in detail.
'Within the law' (principle of legality)
A key principle emanating from the Commission's decisions is that the phrase 'within the law' in article 9(2) accommodates only national law that conforms with international standards and does not allow African states to evade Charter obligations 104 or adopt laws inconsistent with binding international laws. 105 The Commission has set standards to the effect that competent authorities should not enact provisions which would limit the exercise of this freedom. The competent authorities should not override constitutional provisions or undermine fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution and international human rights standards. 106 In Good v Republic of Botswana, 107 Botswana argued that states possess absolute national security prerogative under the Charter's articles 23(1) and 12(2) as applicable under Botswana's Immigration Act. A Presidential Order denied the applicant, a prohibited immigrant, reasons for expulsion and judicial review pursuant to the Act. The Commission held that the Order violated the Applicant's rights to information under article 9(1) and access to justice (article 7) and article 1.
Furthermore, 'within the law' implies that freedom of expression may be subjected only to national security restriction in a rule of law which gives clear notice of restrictions within its scope. 108 This excludes the exercise of unfettered discretion upon persons entrusted with the law's execution. 109 To meet the test, a limiting law, therefore, must be of general application. 110
Legitimate purpose (principle of legitimacy)
To be legitimate, a restriction must apply in clearly-established circumstances and uphold a public interest. In Constitutional Rights Project & Others v Nigeria, 111 which concerned the three military decrees which proscribed certain named newspapers and sealed off their premises without trial for unsubstantiated security reasons, the Commission stated: 112 The only legitimate reasons for limitations of the rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found in article 27(2), that is, that the rights of the Charter shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.
Again, the African Commission has not applied the Model Law's definition of national security within the context of the right to information, 113 but has enjoined states not to conflate their national security with interests of public order, public safety and civil security or to excuse gross violations of people's rights in the interests of national security. 114 Hence, the Commission has repeated that
[t]he reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained. Even more important, a limitation may never have as a consequence that the right itself becomes illusory. 115 This brings to fore the third aspect of the test.
Necessity principle
'Necessity' relates to the concern for proportionality between the extent of the limitation measured against the nature of right involved, and aims to prevent unreasonably excessive limitations. 116 The African Commission has consistently affirmed that restrictions must be as minimal as possible such that the right's infringement is not more than strictly necessary to achieve its desired objective. 117 In Media Rights Agenda, the Commission held that barring the publication of information that creates a real danger to national security, the prohibition of criticisms of official policy violated article 9(2) and was non-compliant with article 27(2). 118 The Commission also upheld the standard that
[t]he reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained. 119 In Constitutional Rights Project & Another v Nigeria, 120 Nigeria's State Security (Detention of Persons) (Amendment) Decree 14 of 1994 permitted indefinite detention for acts 'prejudicial to state security or the economic adversity of the nation', and conferred the sole discretion to determine the interest of state security on the executive. The law denied the right to habeas corpus and judicial remedy for the infringement of rights. These measures were held to be extreme to fulfil the objective of maintaining public peace and a violation of the Charter. 121 Furthermore, any limitation on rights should be 'the least restrictive measures possible' to achieve that need, 122 and be rationally related with its purpose, 123 although the African Commission sometimes endorses the 'less restrictive means' approach of putting a limitation's legitimate aim into effect. 124 Notwithstanding these robust interpretations, the Commission's lacks power to implement its recommendations, often disregarded by states, prompting the setting up of an African Court. 125
African Court's jurisprudence on restrictions to freedom of expression
The African Court was established under article 1 of its enabling instrument 126 to provide effective remedies, 127 to complement and re-inforce the protective mandate of the Commission. 128 The Court has jurisdiction concerning the interpretation and application of its Protocol, the African Charter, and other human rights instruments ratified by state parties, 129 including requests for legal advisory opinions by the AU or AU member states. The Court adjudicates cases from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) recognised by the AU in accordance with article 4(1) 130 and from individuals against state parties that have accepted its individual jurisdiction in terms of article 34(6) of its Protocol. 131 Although the African Court is yet to definitively pronounce on the right to information and national security retractions thereto, it has shown an earnest desire to expand the scope of freedom of expression and constrain restrictions thereof, 132 which portend hope that it would apply analogous principles to the right to information determinations in future. For instance, in Tanganyika [T]he Commission has stated that the 'only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the African Charter' are found in article 27(2) of the Charter. After assessing whether the restriction is effected through a 'law of general application', the Commission applies a proportionality test, in terms of which it weighs the impact, nature and extent of the limitation against the legitimate state interest serving a particular goal. The legitimate interest must be 'proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained'.
The African Court thus affirmed the African Commission's rights restrictions jurisprudence.
Conclusion
Through creative interpretations of the open-ended provisions of article 9 of the African Charter, the African Commission has succeeded in clarifying the normative content of the right to information as a basic right, and as instrumental to other rights' protection, particularly socio-economic rights. In deciding communications, and through its Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, the Commission has elaborated the normative scope and permissible restrictions on the right to information in article 9 in declarations and other soft law instruments. Article 9 of the African Charter certainly permits states to adopt restrictive measures 'within the law' the normative requirements of which are not enumerated unlike comparative human rights provisions. Furthermore, national security protection is not expressly mentioned as a ground for restrictions on the right to information, and the African Charter nowhere requires limitations of rights to be necessary in a democratic society. Notably, the Commission has developed a notion of national security compatible with international human rights law. The Commission has established that the assertion of national security interests by states must be strictly scrutinised. The Commission has creatively laid down criteria comparable with those developed in international human rights law for permissible restrictions on access to information, including on grounds of national security. As can be deduced from its jurisprudence, the Commission has decided that restrictions on the right to information in the interests of national security must be within the law, serve a legitimate public interest and be proportionate for its objective.
The potential of the Commission's recommendations and declarations to protect the right of access to information is seriously hampered by their non-legally binding effect. Fortunately, since the African Court can provide effective remedies, it is hoped that it can effectively police wrongful denials of access to information if its current progress is anything to go by. Hopefully, state parties will now show a greater desire to comply with the Commission's promptings to adopt measures to implement its recommendations, ratify relevant treaties and adopt relevant laws or amend existing domestic laws in compliance with right to information principles as embodied in the Model Law and other relevant international standards. Furthermore, state parties to the African Charter are enjoined to seriously engage with the logic and reasoning of the African Commission and African Court to adopt measures and align their legal frameworks with the fundamental principles of access to information.
